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The Supreme Court: A Unique Institution
John Paul Jones
29 July 2008

Established by the U.S. Constitution in 1789, the
Supreme Court is both the final arbiter of significant
legal cases and the prevailing authority on the
constitutionality of individual laws. While the
Constitution specifies the Court's original
jurisdiction, it does not spell out how the Court
should conduct its business, or even the number of
justices who should serve on the Court or what their
The U.S. Supreme Court building

qualifications should be. Thus, the Founding Fathers
provided a High Court for the nation with the

adaptability to respond to the needs of its citizens.
John Paul Jones is a professor of law at the University of Richmond in Virginia and editor of
the Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce, a contributor to A Biographical Dictionary of
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, and the author of numerous publications on admiralty and
administrative law and other legal specialties.
In the majority of modern states, one tribunal is empowered to assess the constitutionality
of actions by parliament and the executive while another acts as the final court of appeal.
The Supreme Court of the United States is among the distinct minority empowered as both
the highest national court and the legal arbiter of constitutionality. One day's work at the
Court thus might address matters of historic import, while others are filled with the ordinary
chores of a review court, including the supervision of the federal judicial department and
the correction of nonconstitutional decisions by subordinate courts.
The U.S. Constitution makes the Supreme Court of the United States a court of first
instance (the court of "original jurisdiction") for only two rare types of cases: those in which
one American state sues another (usually about a disputed boundary or water rights) and
those in which a foreign diplomat is involved. It is a court of review ("appellate jurisdiction")
for all other types of cases within the reach of federal judicial power, which in the U.S.
federal system is limited both by the nature of the litigants (federal "diversity" jurisdiction
applying to cases between citizens of different states) and the subject matter of their
dispute (the case must arise under the Constitution, a federal law, or a treaty to which the
United States is a party). In our federal system, the highest courts of the 50 states remain

the courts of last resort for all cases in which state law is applied to disputes between
citizens of the forum state. Like the federal and state courts below, the U.S. Supreme Court
generally decides cases by reference to norms found in the common law, in previously
decided cases, in legislation, or in a constitution, state or federal. Since Marbury V. Madison
(1803), American courts are empowered to review government action for conformity with
the supreme law of the land, the U.S. Constitution.
Given the limited nature of its original jurisdiction, the great controversies about public
power in America have come to the Supreme Court on appeal or by similar device from
other state or federal courts. Thus, by the time that national constitutional controversies
reach the Supreme Court, they have been debated, refined, and sometimes dramatically
refocused in prior rounds of lawyers' arguments and judicial decisions in one or more courts
below. The Supreme Court is the tribunal of last resort for virtually all cases of this sort.
By the same token, constitutional controversies come to the Supreme Court only when they
are embedded in specific cases between real litigants. According to Article III of the
Constitution, the Supreme Court's power, in common with that of other federal courts, is
limited to "cases in Law and Equity." No federal court, including the Supreme Court of the
United States, can render an advisory opinion, even at the request of the president or
Congress. No matter how great the controversy, the Court will not hear it unless it is
reduced to one concrete manifestation for a particular person or specific class of persons, in
the form of an injury of the sort the law will notice. At times, outside groups interested in
establishing a legal principle will assist a litigant in a particular case, in hopes of framing an
appeal that will reach the Supreme Court.
While the U.S. Constitution (Article III, Section 2) specifies the types of cases over which
the Supreme Court possesses original jurisdiction, it is silent on whether and how that
jurisdiction might be changed. The Court has ruled that its original jurisdiction cannot be
enlarged except through amendment of the Constitution itself, and the logic of this
reasoning dictates the same conclusion for any limitation of original jurisdiction.
The Constitution is not silent, however, about whether and how the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction may be changed; Article III, Section 2 assigns Congress the power to
alter it with "exceptions or regulations." Thus, it is only with legislative branch acquiescence
that the Supreme Court continues to entertain appeals that pose great constitutional
controversies. Even so, Congress has only once (in a case involving the detention of Civil
War [1861-1865] prisoners) seen fit to restrict the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Any effort
today by Congress to limit the appellate jurisdiction of the Court would undoubtedly prove
highly controversial.
Jurisdiction, of course, merely defines the universe of cases that are eligible for review; the
Constitution does not compel the Court to accept any particular appeal. Indeed,
conventional wisdom suggests it could not be otherwise, given the overwhelming number of
such applications and the relatively limited decision making resources of the Court. The
Court itself selects the overwhelming majority of its docket by means of the writ of
certiorari, a legal order directing a lower court to send up a complete record of the case
below for review.
FEW BASIC RULES

The Constitution provisions that established the
Supreme Court deliberately provide only a few basic
jurisdictional rules. They do not dictate the
procedures under which the Supreme Court does its
business. Indeed, they are quite vague about the
Court's composition. Article III does not limit the
number of Supreme Court judges (justices), and
Congress, which has the power to alter the Court's
size and composition, has not done so in more than
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a century, even as the volume of applications to the

sovereignty.

Court has grown dramatically. Moreover, by its own
decision, the Court continues to hear cases sitting only en banc (with all justices
participating).
Unlike some modern constitutions, the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly command
judges to explain their decisions in writing, but American courts, including the Supreme
Court, long ago adopted the practice of issuing written opinions explaining and enlarging
upon their judgments. Whereas it was (and is) the practice of multijudge English courts to
publish the separate opinions of each judge involved, the U.S. Supreme Court early
embraced the alternative of joint opinions written by one of the justices and endorsed by
one or more of the others. The complete text of these opinions has long been widely
published, so that all in America, and elsewhere for that matter, may review almost
immediately the legal reasoning on which important judgments are founded. From the
beginning, dissenting justices have been heard and their dissents published alongside the
majority opinion (or opinions). This allows readers to see, for example, how close the
minority view came to persuading one or more justices in the majority. There are several
examples in U.S. constitutional history of dissents embodying interpretations that later
supplanted the then-majority view.
Although the Constitution imposes specific age, residency, and citizenship qualifications for
the president of the United States and members of Congress, it sets no similar qualifications
for Supreme Court justices, except that every candidate must be the president's choice and
acceptable to a majority in the Senate. No prior experience as a judge, no expertise as a
constitutionalist, indeed, no training in the law at all, is formally necessary. Nevertheless,
virtually every appointment has come from the pool of those with training in the law and
professional experience as lawyers and judges. On a few occasions, great constitutional
controversies with obviously moral dimensions (slavery, abortion, segregation) have
polarized American opinion about the selection of Supreme Court justices, but whether any
candidate's sympathy with one side of a particular issue should determine his or her
selection remains an open question.
According to the Constitution as amended, each U.S. president serves a term of four years
and may be re-elected for only one additional term. U.S. senators serve six-year terms and
may be re-elected without limit, while members of the House of Representatives serve
terms of two years and similarly may be re-elected without limit. On the other hand, federal
court judges, including the justices of the Supreme Court, serve effectively without any limit
short of their life spans. The youngest justice was appointed to the Supreme Court of the
United States when he was only 29 years old. Another served on the Court for 34 years,
and no new justice has joined the present Court in more than 10 years.
CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS

Not all American constitutional controversies are large and notorious. Nor are they all
decided by the Supreme Court, or indeed by any court. As elsewhere in the world, countless
constitutional questions are decided daily in the performance of their duties by officers of
the federal and state governments, as well as by legislators voting in Congress and state
assemblies. Thus, most constitutional questions in America are answered by democratically
elected officials who come and go from the offices in which this power resides. As they
come and go, so changes the working version of the Constitution. That said, there remain
the relatively few controversies, usually persistent and notorious, that come finally to the
Supreme Court. To the extent that any jurist's opinions of fundamental constitutional
matters remain more or less intact after weathering term after term of debate, those of a
Supreme Court justice are, therefore, relatively more deeply rooted and comparatively
more influential than those of decision makers in the political branches of government.
Leaving aside any question of inevitable debility, we are left to ponder whether the
Constitution itself is well served by such a system, in which a particular constitutional
jurisprudence can become so personally entrenched. Calls for limiting judicial tenure, in
particular that of the Supreme Court, have sounded occasionally since the turn of the 19th
century, so far without persuading the super-majorities required to enact the necessary
constitutional amendment.
In the federal democratic republic that is the United States of America, we sometimes look
with awe upon the evolution of the judicial power outlined by the Constitution. A nonelected
and tenured federal judiciary, led by the Supreme Court of the United States, has assumed
the power to declare unconstitutional and, therefore, void the acts of elected assemblies
and executives, state and federal. It might seem surprising that the politico-legal culture
has for so long and without great stress accommodated that development. The Court's
constitutional judgment has been overridden by constitutional amendment only three times
so far— by ratification of the Constitution's 11th (limiting federal lawsuits by a citizen of one
state [or of a foreign nation] against another U.S. state), 14th (overruling the decision in
Scott v. Sanford that blacks could not be citizens with access to the federal courts), and
16th (allowing Congress to levy an income tax) Amendments. Yet a closer look ought to
reveal the largely self-imposed (but no less effective) limits within which judicial power has
been constrained, as well as the political forbearance upon which its continued exercise
depends. American rule of law is fluid, collaborative, and adaptable; a less-supple
constitutional order might not have survived as long.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author.
From the April 2005 edition of eJournal USA.
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